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Abstract—This paper studies the impact of transmit antenna
selection on the secrecy performance of massive MIMO wiretap
channels. We consider a scenario in which a multi-antenna trans-
mitter selects a subset of transmit antennas with the strongest
channel gains. Confidential messages are then transmitted to
a multi-antenna legitimate receiver while the channel is being
overheard by a multi-antenna eavesdropper. For this setup,
we approximate the distribution of the instantaneous secrecy
rate in the large-system limit. The approximation enables us
to investigate the optimal number of selected antennas which
maximizes the asymptotic secrecy throughput of the system. We
show that increasing the number of selected antennas enhances
the secrecy performance of the system up to some optimal value,
and that further growth in the number of selected antennas has
a destructive effect. Using the large-system approximation, we
obtain the optimal number of selected antennas analytically for
various scenarios. Our numerical investigations show an accurate
match between simulations and the analytic results even for not
so large dimensions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems
have been identified as a key technology for the next gener-
ation of wireless communication systems [1]. Consequently,
physical layer security of these systems has gained significant
attentions in recent years [2]. The main premise in physical
layer security is to exploit the inherent characteristics of
wireless channels. The pioneering work of Wyner [3], con-
sidered the wiretap channel as a basic model for secure
transmission and demonstrated that secrecy is obtained as
long as the legitimate receiver observes a better channel than
the eavesdropper. Provisioning secrecy for MIMO wiretap
channels, also referred to as Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
Multiple-Eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels, was then stud-
ied in the literature widely [4], [5]. The fact of using mul-
tiple antennas in these systems can significantly improve the
secrecy performance by means of focusing the transmission
beam to the legitimate receiver. This technique in massive
MIMO systems effectively provides secrecy due to the large
number of antennas, and makes them robust against passive
eavesdropping [2].
The performance gains in MIMO systems are mainly
obtained at the expense of elevated complexity and cost. In
fact, the growth in the number of antennas, increases both
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the computational complexity and Radio Frequency (RF)-cost
significantly. Consequently, addressing solutions to alleviate
these issues has become a topic of interest. Antenna selection
is introduced as a possible solution which reduces the overall
RF-cost, as well as the computational complexity, without
significant performance loss [6]. This solution was recently
further raised up in the context of massive MIMO systems,
due to the large dimensions of these systems [7], [8].
Although antenna selection vanishes the robustness of
massive MIMO systems against passive eavesdropping, it still
can enhance the secrecy performance compared to conven-
tional MIMO systems. For single Transmit Antenna Selection
(TAS), the problem of secure transmission was initially stud-
ied in [9]. The authors in [9] considered a scenario in which
a multi-antenna transmitter with a single RF-chain intends to
send confidential messages to a single-antenna legitimate re-
ceiver while a single-antenna eavesdropper is overhearing the
channel. The study was later extended in [10] to the case of
multi-antenna eavesdropper where the authors showed that,
similar to the case with a single-antenna eavesdropper, the
secrecy outage probability improves when the number of
antennas at the transmitter side increases. [11] investigated
the TAS for secure transmission in the general MIMOME
wiretap channel assuming that a single RF-chain available at
the transmitter. The problem was further studied in [12] for
Nakagami-m fading considering the single TAS. The impacts
of the imperfect channel estimation and antenna correlation
were also investigated in [13] and [11]. In contrast to the
single TAS, the secrecy performance of massive MIMOME
channels under the multiple TAS has not been yet addressed in
the literature. In this case, increasing the number of transmit
antennas is beneficial to both the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper simultaneously, and therefore, its effect on the
overall secrecy performance is not clear.
Contributions
In this paper, we study the impact of multiple TAS on the
secrecy performance of massive MIMOME channels. In par-
ticular, we consider a general MIMOME setup with a large
number of transmit antennas in which a subset of antennas
with the strongest channel gains is selected. We show that
under the given TAS protocol, increasing the number of
selected antennas up to an optimal value can enhance the
secrecy performance of the system. The impact, however, can
be destructive if the number of the selected antennas exceeds
the optimal value.
Notation
Throughout the paper the following notations are adopted.
Scalars, vectors and matrices are represented with non-bold,
bold lower case and bold upper case letters, respectively. HH
indicates the Hermitian of H, and IN is the N ×N identity
matrix. The determinant of H and Euclidean norm of x are
denoted by |H| and ‖x‖. log (·) and ln (·) indicate the binary
and natural logarithm respectively, and 1{·} denotes the
indicator function. E {·} is statistical expectation, and
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
φ(x)dx (1)
represents the standard Q-function where φ(x) is the zero-
mean and unit-variance Gaussian probability density function.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a Gaussian MIMOME channel in which the
transmitter, legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are equipped
with Nt, Nr and Ne antennas, respectively. At each trans-
mit interval, the transmitter encodes its messages into the
codeword xNt×1 and sends it to the legitimate receiver. The
received signal is given by the vector yNr×1 which reads
y =
√
ρm Hmx+ nm. (2)
Here, ρm denotes the average Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
at each receive antenna, nm is circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian noise with zero-mean and unit-variance, i.e., nm ∼
CN (0, I) and Hm is an Nr ×Nt independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) unit-variance quasi-static Rayleigh fading
channel matrix and is referred to as the main channel. The ea-
vesdropper overhears x and receives zNe×1 given by
z =
√
ρe Hex+ ne, (3)
where ρe is the average SNR at each of the eavesdropper an-
tennas, ne ∼ CN (0, I), and He identifies an Ne ×Nt i.i.d.
unit-variance quasi-static Rayleigh fading channel matrix be-
tween the transmitter and eavesdropper. We denote it as the
eavesdropper channel. The legitimate receiver and eavesdrop-
per have the Channel State Information (CSI) of their chan-
nels. At the transmit side, however, the CSI of the channels
is not necessarily available. Moreover, the main and eave-
sdropper channels are supposed to be statistically independent.
A. TAS Protocol
Let the Nr × 1 vector hmj denote the jth column vector
of Hm for j ∈ {1, . . . , Nt}. Represent the index set of order
statistics from the arranging of vector norms ‖hmj‖ in de-
creasing order by W := {w1, . . . , wNt}, i.e.,
‖hmw1‖ ≥ ‖hmw2‖ ≥ · · · ≥ ‖hmwNt‖. (4)
At each transmission interval, the transmitter selects Lt trans-
mit antennas via the TAS protocol S as follows:
(a) The ordered index setW is determined at the transmitter
and legitimate receiver. At the transmit side, the task
is done either by supposing the transmitter to estimate
the channel gains itself, or assuming W to be evaluated
by the legitimate receiver and given to the transmitter
through a rate-limited return channel.
(b) The transmitter then selects the Lt antennas which
correspond to the index subset WS := {w1, . . . , wLt}
and transmits over them with equal average power.
Remark: Considering the task of determining W, the trans-
mitter, even in the absence of a return channel, need not ac-
quire the complete CSI. In fact, as W is determined via the
ordering in (4), the transmitter only needs to estimate the
channel norms. The task which can be done at the prior uplink
stage simply by attaching RF power meters at each transmit
antenna, and requires a significantly reduced time interval
compared to the case of complete CSI estimation [14].
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
For the MIMOME channel specified in (2) and (3), the in-
stantaneous secrecy rate is expressed as [4], [5]
Rs = [Rm −Re]+ (5)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}. Here, Rm denotes the achievable
rate over the main channel which is determined as
Rm = log|I+ ρmHmQHHm| (6)
and Re is the achievable rate over the eavesdropper channel
given by
Re = log|I+ ρeHeQHHe | (7)
with QNt×Nt being the diagonal power allocation matrix. Co-
nsidering the TAS protocol S, Q reads
[Q]ww =
{
1 w ∈WS
0 w /∈WS (8)
in which the average transmit power on each selected antenna
is set to be one. Consequently, Rm and Re reduce to
Rm = log|I+ ρmH˜HmH˜m| (9a)
Re = log|I+ ρeH˜He H˜e| (9b)
where H˜m and H˜e are Nr×Lt matrices denoting the effective
main and eavesdropper channels respectively. The effective
channels are constructed from Hm and He by collecting the
columns which correspond to the selected antennas. Substi-
tuting in (5), the maximum achievable secrecy rate reads
Rs (S) =
[
log
|I+ ρmH˜HmH˜m|
|I+ ρeH˜He H˜e|
]+
(10)
where the argument S is written to indicate the dependency
of Rs (S) on the TAS protocol.
Using Rs in (5), different secrecy measures for the system
is defined based on the eavesdropper’s status. When the CSI
of the eavesdropper channel is available at the transmit side,
(5) determines the instantaneous achievable secrecy rate, and
thus, its expected value determines the ergodic secrecy rate.
For a passive eavesdropper, the probability of Rs being less
than ROut evaluates the outage probability which represents
probability of having information leakage when the transmit-
ter has set the secrecy rate to ROut [15].
III. LARGE-SYSTEM SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF TAS
In this section, we investigate the secrecy performance of
the MIMOME wiretap channel under the TAS protocol S con-
sidering the following two cases:
A The eavesdropper is equipped with significantly fewer
receive antennas compared to the number of selected an-
tennas, i.e., Ne ≪ Lt.
B The number of eavesdropper antennas grows large faster
than the number of selected antennas, i.e., Ne ≫ Lt.
Case A can be seen as a scenario in cellular networks with
the eavesdropper being a regular user terminal. Moreover,
Case B describes a scenario in which the eavesdropper is
a sophisticated terminal, such as portable stations.
Proposition 1 approximates the distribution of the maxi-
mum achievable secrecy rate in the large-system limit, i.e.,
Nt ↑ ∞, for both Cases A and B.
Proposition 1: Consider the TAS protocol S, and let
ηt = Nr [Lt +NtfNr+1(u)] (11a)
σ2t = (Ltu− ηt)2
(
1
Lt
− 1
Nt
)
− η
2
t
Lt
+ Ξt (11b)
for some non-negative real u which satisfies∫ ∞
u
fNr(x)dx =
Lt
Nt
, (12)
Ξt which is given by
Ξt := Nr (Nr + 1) [Lt +NtfNr+1(u) +NtfNr+2(u)] , (13)
and fNr(·) which represents the chi-square probability density
function with 2Nr degrees of freedom and mean Nr, i.e.,
fNr(x) =
1
(Nr − 1)!
{
xNr−1e−x, if x ≥ 0
0, if x < 0.
(14)
Define Lm := min {Lt, Nr}, Mm := max {Lt, Nr}, Le :=
min {Lt, Ne} and Me := max {Lt, Ne}. As Nt grows large,
the distribution of Rs(S) for both Cases A and B can be
approximated by the distribution of Rasy(S) := [R⋆]+ in
which R⋆ is a Gaussian random variable with mean η and
variance σ2 given by (15) and (16) on the top of the next page.
Proof Sketch: To evaluate the large-system distribution of
Rs(S), one needs to determine the asymptotic distribution of
Rm andRe given by (6) and (7) respectively. Using the results
from [8] and [16], the distribution of Rm and Re in the large
system limits for the both cases A and B can be approximated
by Gaussian distributions. Noting the fact that the main and
eavesdropper channels are independent, the random variable
R⋆ := Rm −Re, (17)
in the large limit, can then be approximated with a Gaussian
random variable whose variance and mean is determined in
terms of the variances and means of Rm and Re. Finally
by substituting in (5), the proof is concluded. The detailed
derivations are given in the appendix.
Considering (16), one can observe that the variations of
the secrecy rate vanish as the dimensions of the system
increase. In fact, as Nt grows large ηt grows proportionally,
and therefore, the first term in (16) tends to zero. Moreover,
as Le/Me in our setup is considered to be significantly small,
the two other terms can be neglected further. Consequently,
in the large limit σ converges to zero; the observation which
could be intuitively predicted, due to the fact that the both
main and eavesdropper channels harden in the large limit.
The mean value η, however, does not necessarily increase in
the large-system limit, since it is given as the difference of
two terms which can both asymptotically grow large. The
latter observation indicates that increasing the number of
selected antennas for this setup does not necessarily improve
the secrecy rate. We discuss this argument later in Section
IV. At this point, we employ Proposition 1 to evaluate the
ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate
For scenarios in which the CSI of the eavesdropper channel
is available at the transmit side, the instantaneous secrecy
rate is achievable in each transmission interval. Therefore, the
secrecy performance is characterized by the ergodic secrecy
rate which is given by taking the expectation of Rs (S).
Using Proposition 1, the ergodic secrecy rate for our setup
in the large limit is approximated as
RErg (S) ≈ E {Rasy (S)} (18a)
= E
{
[R⋆]+
}
(18b)
= σ φ (ξ) + ηQ(−ξ) . (18c)
where ξ :=
η
σ
. Using the inequality Q(x) <
φ (x)
x
for x > 0,
we conclude
RErg (S) > η (19)
for ξ > 0; the bound is tight when ξ is large enough. Fig. 1
illustrates the accuracy of the approximations, as well as the
tightness of the lower-bound in (19). The figure has been
plotted for Nr = Ne = 2 and Lt = 8 considering 16 transmit
antennas and ρe = −5 dB. As the figure shows, except for the
interval of ρm in which η is close to zero, the lower-bound in
(19) perfectly matches RErg(S). This observation is due to
fact that the variance in the large limit tends to zero rapidly,
and thus, the factor ξ grows significantly large even for finite
values of η; therefore,Q(−ξ) ≈ 1−ξ−1φ(ξ), and the ergodic
secrecy rate is approximated with η accurately. Despite the
initial assumptions on the system dimensions taken in Sec-
tions II and III, one observes that the approximation accurately
tracks the simulations even in not so large dimensions.
η := Lm log
(
1 +
ρmηt
Lm
)
− Lm (Lm − 1) ρ
2
mη
2
t
2Mm (Lm + ρmηt)
2
log e− Le log (1 + ρeMe) (15)
σ2 :=


[
Lmρm
Lm + ρmηt
− L
2
m (Lm − 1) ρ2mηt
Mm (Lm + ρmηt)
3
]2
σ2t + 1{Ne>Lt}
Le
Me
+ 1{Ne<Lt}
LeMeρ
2
e
(1 + ρeMe)
2

 log2 e (16)
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Fig. 1: The ergodic secrecy rate in terms of the main channel’s SNR. The
curves have been plotted for Nr = Ne = 2, LT = 8, Nt = 16 and
ρe = −5 dB. RErg(S) in (18c) and the numerical simulations are sketched
by a black line and red circles respectively. The blue line indicate [η]+ for
η given in (15). As it shows, the approximation tracks the simulations with
high accuracy even for finite dimensions.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
When the eavesdropper is passively overhearing the chan-
nel, the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is not known at the
transmitter, and thus, the secrecy rate in (5) is not achievable.
The performance in this case is described by the secrecy
outage probability which for a given rate ROut ≥ 0 is de-
fined as [15]
POut (ROut) = Pr {Rs (S) < ROut} . (20)
The interpretation of this secrecy measure is as follows: As the
transmitter does not have the CSI of the eavesdropper channel,
it sets the secrecy rate to beROut in all transmission intervals.
This setting implicitly imposes a primary assumption on the
quality of the eavesdropper channel. In this case, the outage
probability in (20) determines the probability of eavesdropper
channel having better quality than the primary assumption, or
equivalently, the percentage of intervals in which the eaves-
dropper can decode transmitted codewords at least partially.
Using the large-system approximation in Proposition 1, the
outage probability in the large limit reads
POut (ROut) ≈ Pr {Rasy (S) ≤ ROut} (21a)
= 1−Q
(ROut − η
σ
)
. (21b)
IV. SECRECY ENHANCEMENT VIA TAS
Considering either the ergodic secrecy rate or the secrecy
outage probability, the secrecy performance of the system in
the large limit is mainly specified by η. In contrast to σ which
tends to zero in the asymptotic regime, the factor η, for a
given number of receive and eavesdropper antennas, can either
grow, vanish or tend to some constant in the large-system limit
depending on the number of selected antennas.
To illustrate the point further, we have plotted in Fig. 2
the ergodic secrecy rate of the system as a function of
Lt, for some given numbers of receive and eavesdropper
antennas considering both the large-system approximation
given by (18c), and numerical simulations. The curves have
been sketched for ρm = 0 dB and ρe = −10 dB. As
the figure shows, for the considered setups, the ergodic
secrecy rate meets its maximum at some values of Lt which
are significantly smaller than Nt. The observation which
expresses that the TAS in these scenarios, not only benefits
in terms of RF-cost reduction, but also enhances the secrecy
performance of the system. The intuition behind this behavior
comes from the fact that the growth in the number of selected
antennas improves both the main and eavesdropper channels.
In this case as Fig. 2 indicates, the improvement from the
legitimate receiver’s point of view dominates the overall
secrecy performance of the system up to a certain number of
selected antennas. By increasing Lt further, the improvement
at the eavesdropper side starts to dominate which results in
the performance deficit at larger values of Lt.
A. Optimal Number of Selected Antennas
Considering the illustrated behavior of the system, a smart
choice of Lt can significantly improve the overall system
throughput at no cost. In this case, the results given in Section
III can be employed, in order to find the optimal number
of selected transmit antennas. More precisely, using (15)
and (16), one can determine the ergodic secrecy rate and
secrecy outage probability in (18c) and (21b) as functions
of Lt whose maximizers are found either analytic or via a
linear search. We investigate this problem further through the
following examples by considering the ergodic secrecy rate
as the measure. Same discussions can also be considered for
the secrecy outage probability
Example 1 (Single-antenna receivers): Consider the case in
which the legitimate receiver, as well as the eavesdropper, is
equipped with a single receive antenna, i.e., Nr = Ne = 1.
This can be seen as a scenario in which both the legitimate
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Fig. 2: The ergodic secrecy rate as a function of Lt for three different cases
considering Nt = 128, ρm = 0 dB and ρe = −10 dB. The approximation
in (18c) and numerical simulations are denoted by solid lines and circles
respectively. As it shows, the values of Lt in which RErg(S) meets the
maximum is significantly smaller than Nt.
receiver and eavesdropper are handheld devices. Considering
the ergodic secrecy rate as the performance measure, we are
interested in determining the optimal number of selected an-
tennas which maximizes RErg (S).
Let us denote the optimal number of selected antennas by
L⋆t . In order to employ the results in Section III, we assume
at this point that L⋆t ≫ 1; we later show that the assumption
holds for the large limit of Nt. By substituting in (15) and
(16), η and σ2 are determined as
η = log
(
1 + ρmLt
(
1 + lnNtL
−1
t
)
1 + ρeLt
)
(22a)
σ2 =
[
ρ2m Lt
(
2− LtN−1t
)
(1 + ρeLt)
2
+
Ltρ
2
e
(1 + ρeLt)2
]
log2 e. (22b)
By taking the limit Nt ↑ ∞ and considering L⋆t ≫ 1, it is
concluded that ξ is large, and therefore, RErg (S) ≈ η. To
find L⋆t , we define the function
f(x) := log
(
1 + ρmx+ ρmx lnNtx
−1
1 + ρex
)
(23)
over the real axis. It is then straightforward to show that, for
x ∈ [1, Nt], f ′′(x) ≤ 0, and thus, one can conclude that L⋆t is
an integer close to the maximizer of f(·). Consequently, L⋆t
can be approximated as L⋆t ≈ ⌊x⋆⌉ where x⋆ satisfies
ρex
⋆ + lnx⋆ +
ρe
ρm
= lnNt. (24)
As x⋆ grows large proportional to Nt, L
⋆
t grows accordingly,
and therefore, the initial assumption of L⋆t ≫ 1 in the large-
system limit holds. Moreover, by reducing ρe to zero in the
fixed point equation (24), L⋆t = Nt which agrees with the
fact that in the absence of the eavesdropper, the ergodic rate
is a monotonically increasing function of Lt.
PSfrag replacements
R E
rg
(S
)
Lt
approximation
simulation
20 40 60 80 100 120
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
Fig. 3: RErg(S) in Example 1 in terms of the number of selected antennas.
The solid line and the circles show the approximation given by (18c) and
numerical simulations respectively considering Nt = 128, ρm = 0 dB
and ρe = −10 dB. As it is observed, L⋆t = 18 is suggested by both the
approximation and simulation results.
Fig. 3 shows the ergodic secrecy rate as a function of Lt for
ρe = −10 dB and 128 transmit antennas. By solving the fixed
point equation in (24), x⋆ = 18.4 is obtained which results
in L⋆t = 18. The result which is confirmed by numerical
simulations as well.
Example 2 (Multi-antenna eavesdropper): As another exam-
ple, we consider a scenario with a single antenna legitimate
receiver whose channel is being overheard by a sophisticated
muti-antenna terminal, i.e., Nr = 1 and Ne growing large.
Similar to Example 1, let us take the ergodic secrecy rate as
the performance measure. For this case, η and σ2 in (15) and
(16) reduce to
η = log
(
1 + ρmLt
(
1 + lnNtL
−1
t
)
(1 + ρeNe)Lt
)
(25a)
σ2 =
ρ2m log
2 e Lt
(
2− LtN−1t
)
(1 + ρeLt)
2
+
log2 e
Lt
. (25b)
In contrast to Example 1, the ratio ξ in this case does not nec-
essarily take large values, and consequently, RErg (S) is not
approximated by η. Therefore, we define c(·) over R as
c(x) := s(x)φ (h(x)) + f(x)Q (−h(x)) (26)
where f(x) and [s(x)]2 are obtained by replacing Lt with
x in (25a) and (25b) respectively, and h(x) := [s(x)]−1f(x).
With similar lines of inference the optimal number of selected
antennas is approximated as L⋆t ≈ ⌊x⋆⌉ with x⋆ satisfying
φ (h(x⋆)) {2f(x⋆)h′(x⋆)−s′(x⋆)}=f ′(x⋆)Q (−h(x⋆)) . (27)
In Fig. 4, RErg(S) is sketched in terms of the number of
selected antennas forNe = 16, ρe = −25 dB and 128 transmit
antennas. From the fixed point equation in (27), the extreme
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Fig. 4: The ergodic secrecy rate in Example 2 vs. Lt for the case with
Ne = 16, Nt = 128, ρm = 0 dB and ρe = −25 dB. The large-system
approximation and numerical simulations are denoted by the solid line and
circles respectively, and both suggest L⋆t = 14.
point of the curve occurs at x⋆ = 13.7 which recovers L⋆t =
14 given by the simulation results.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have characterized the effect of multiple
TAS on the secrecy performance of a massive MIMOME
channel by considering the ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy
outage probability. For this setup, the instantaneous secrecy
rate has been approximated in terms of a Gaussian random
variable when the number of transmit antennas grows large.
This approximation enabled us to show that, for several sce-
narios, the secrecy performance of the system is maximized
at some optimal number of selected antennas. Our numerical
simulations showed that the optimal number of transmit
antennas is accurately approximated for finite dimensions.
APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF PROPOSITION 1
We start by determining the large-system distribution of
Rm given in (6). In [8, Lemma 2], it has been shown that
the distribution of the input-output mutual information of
a Gaussian MIMO channel, under some constraints, is ap-
proximated sufficiently close to its exact value in terms of
the random variables Tr{J} and Tr{J2} where J := HHH.
Under the TAS protocol S, Tr{J} represents the sum of Lt
first order statistics which at the large limit of Nt converges
in distribution to a Gaussian random variable whose mean
and variance are given by (11a) and (11b), respectively
[8]. Using some properties of random matrices, the large-
system distribution of Rm is then approximated as in [8,
Proposition 1] with a Gaussian distribution whose mean and
variance are given in terms of ηt and σ
2
t .
The next step is to evaluate the distribution of Re. Noting
that the main and eavesdropper channels are independent, it
is concluded that the TAS protocol S performs as a random
selection protocol from the eavesdropper’s point of view.
Therefore, Tr{J} and Tr{J2} in both the cases A and B can
be determined explicitly as functions of independent Gaussian
random variables. By substituting in [8, Lemma 1] and taking
the limit of Nt growing large, the large-system distribution of
Re can be approximated with a Gaussian distribution whose
mean and variance are respectively given by
ηe = Le log (1 + ρeMe) (28a)
σ2e =
(
1{Ne>Lt}
Le
Me
+1{Ne<Lt}
LeMeρ
2
e
(1 + ρeMe)
2
)
log2 e (28b)
which recovers the asymptotic results for i.i.d. Gaussian
fading channels given in [16]. Using the independency of
the main and eavesdropper channels, R⋆ in (17) can be
approximated in the large system limit with a Gaussian ran-
dom variable whose mean and variance are as in (15) and (16).
REFERENCES
[1] T. L. Marzetta, “Noncooperative cellular wireless with unlimited num-
bers of base station antennas,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Commu-
nications, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 3590–3600, 2010.
[2] D. Kapetanovic, G. Zheng, and F. Rusek, “Physical layer security for
massive MIMO: An overview on passive eavesdropping and active
attacks,” IEEE Comm. Mag., vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 21–27, 2015.
[3] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Labs Technical Journal,
vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[4] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas—Part II: The MIMOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515–5532, 2010.
[5] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp.
4961–4972, 2011.
[6] A. F. Molisch and M. Z. Win, “MIMO systems with antenna selection,”
IEEE microwave magazine, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 46–56, 2004.
[7] H. Li, L. Song, and M. Debbah, “Energy efficiency of large-scale
multiple antenna systems with transmit antenna selection,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Communications, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 638–647, 2014.
[8] S. Asaad, A. Bereyhi, R. R. Müller, and A. M. Rabiei, “Asymptotics
of transmit antenna selection: Impact of multiple receive antennas,” in
Inter. Conf. on Comm. (ICC). IEEE, 2017.
[9] H. Alves, R. D. Souza, and M. Debbah, “Enhanced physical layer se-
curity through transmit antenna selection,” in GLOBECOM Workshops
(GC Wkshps), 2011 IEEE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 879–883.
[10] H. Alves, R. D. Souza, M. Debbah, and M. Bennis, “Performance
of transmit antenna selection physical layer security schemes,” IEEE
Signal Processing Letters, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 372–375, 2012.
[11] N. Yang, H. A. Suraweera, I. B. Collings, and C. Yuen, “Physical layer
security of TAS/MRC with antenna correlation,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 254–259, 2013.
[12] L. Wang, M. Elkashlan, J. Huang, R. Schober, and R. K. Mallik,
“Secure transmission with antenna selection in MIMO Nakagami-m
fading channels,” IEEE Trans. on Wireless Comm., vol. 13, no. 11, pp.
6054–6067, 2014.
[13] F. S. Al-Qahtani, Y. Huang, S. Hessien, R. M. Radaydeh, C. Zhong, and
H. M. Alnuweiri, “Secrecy analysis of MIMO wiretap channels with
low-complexity receivers under imperfect channel estimation,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 12, no. 2, pp.
257–270, 2017.
[14] A. B. Narasimhamurthy and C. Tepedelenlioglu, “Antenna selection for
MIMO-OFDM systems with channel estimation error,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 2269–2278, 2009.
[15] J. Barros and M. R. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless channels,”
in Information Theory, Inter. Symp. on. IEEE, 2006, pp. 356–360.
[16] B. M. Hochwald, T. L. Marzetta, and V. Tarokh, “Multiple-antenna
channel hardening and its implications for rate feedback and schedul-
ing,” Trans. on Inf. Theory, vol. 50, no. 9, pp. 1893–1909, 2004.
